



# Psychological Inquiry

An International Journal for the Advancement of Psychological Theory

ISSN: 1047-840X (Print) 1532-7965 (Online) Journal homepage: <https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hpli20>

## A Modern Perspective on the Classic American Dilemma

Patricia G. Devine

To cite this article: Patricia G. Devine (2003) A Modern Perspective on the Classic American Dilemma, *Psychological Inquiry*, 14:3-4, 244-250, DOI: [10.1080/1047840X.2003.9682887](https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2003.9682887)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2003.9682887>



Published online: 22 Jun 2011.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 95



View related articles [↗](#)

## A Modern Perspective on the Classic American Dilemma

Patricia G. Devine

Department of Psychology  
University of Wisconsin – Madison

Although I didn't realize it at the time, the seeds for what would become my primary research interests, and the focus of my 1989 article, were planted early. There were really two puzzling experiences that served as preludes to the general set of issues that would ultimately consume a great deal of my professional attention. The first was the question I was asked most frequently when I was growing up: "Are you Catholic?" Well, I was, in fact, raised Catholic, but for a long time I wondered why I was always asked that question. Over time what I came to realize is that question followed quickly on the heels of my disclosure that I have seven siblings. It became clear to me that, for many, the number of children in a family immediately led to inferences about group membership.

The second puzzling experience occurred in the context of my family's relocating frequently when I was a kid. We lived in a number of different communities, each of which had distinct ethnic identities. In one location, most of people were Jewish; in another, most were Polish; and in still another, most were Italian. These circumstances paved the way for me to observe that many people acted as if knowledge of others' ethnic backgrounds, generally cued by their last names, conveyed a wealth of information about these others' personalities, likely interests, and other qualities. And the inferences were made quickly. These inferences from group membership to personal qualities seemed unwarranted and were quite often wrong. As an 8- or 10-year-old, I didn't call this *stereotyping* or understand the process involved, but I did worry that it was unfair and thought people should not make such inferences. My strategy at the time—don't learn last names.

Fast-forward some 15 or so years, and I found myself in an intellectual context that provided the opportunity to explore these ideas and begin to develop a conceptual analysis of how and why such inferences are pervasive and hard to eliminate. Indeed, the context for one's emerging ideas reflects the confluence of a broad set of influences. The editors asked that I reflect on how the research and resulting article concerning the automatic and controlled processes involved in stereotyping and prejudice came about and to generally provide a "behind-the-scenes," autobiographical look at the process. Intellectually, each of us is a product of our environments (where we study or work), what we read, and the intangible "what we personally bring to

the situation"—such as my concerns over the unwarranted inferences people quickly made about others—that affect what we find ourselves interested in studying. With that in mind, and per the editors' request, here's how my formal interest in and early work on stereotyping and prejudice developed.

The work reported in my article (Devine, 1989) was based on my dissertation research completed at Ohio State University (OSU). I believe that both the direct and indirect aspects of the graduate program at OSU played a key role in enabling me to do this work. The program faculty at that time, Tim Brock, Tony Greenwald, and Tom Ostrom (Gifford Weary was just beginning to consider the transition from clinical to social, though her influence on the social students was significant), put together a truly student centered program.<sup>1</sup> As I look back, there was something extraordinary, if somewhat hard to pin down, about the graduate training at OSU. One need only consider the scholars who emerged from that era of the OSU program—the likes of Claude Steele, Rich Petty, John Cacioppo, Gary Wells, and Mahzarin Banaji to name but a few—to appreciate that there was something about the training that was special. From the way the faculty devised their curriculum to the now legendary speaker series at OSU, the goal was to create an environment in which students could mature and develop into independent scholars. And there was little ambiguity that the faculty fully expected us to develop in such ways. Through their own empirical and theoretical activities, the faculty modeled both careful scholarship and a willingness to take intellectual risks. It was Tony, for example, who was willing to pursue (and pursue and pursue) null effects in his sleeper effect work until he fully understood the phenomenon (Pratkanis, Leippe, Greenwald, & Baumgardner, 1988) and who coined new terminology (e.g., *benefactance*) in his 1980 "Totalitarian Ego" article. Tom, during a time when there was increasing resistance to social cognition in some sectors of our discipline, wrote an article titled "The Sovereignty of Social Cognition" (Ostrom, 1984). In retrospect, I think it may have been the faculty's penchant for taking intellectual risks and trusting their in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Bibb Latané was on sabbatical the year I arrived on campus and, as it turned out, never returned to OSU. Although I had no personal exchanges with Bibb, his influence on the program and its students continued to be felt in his absence.

instincts that had the biggest and perhaps most enduring effect on my own intellectual endeavors.

During my early years at OSU, I established a wonderful collaboration and working relationship with my graduate mentor, Tom Ostrom. Tom was working on person memory–related issues when I arrived on campus, and I conducted a number of studies addressing issues concerning how the organization social information in the stimulus field affects memory organization and social judgment. Although I found this work interesting and intellectually engaging—and I learned an enormous amount working with Tom, both about how to conceptualize a problem and about good experimental design—over time I found that the person memory issues did not fully capture my imagination or passion. Thus, at that point, I knew what I did not want to study for my dissertation work, but I had no idea what I did want to study. With these uncertainties in mind, during the summer after my 3rd year in graduate school, the time at which we were expected to be developing dissertation proposal ideas, I began to read widely. It would be nice to say I had a burning desire at the time to do socially relevant research, but the truth of the matter is that I was just looking for something interesting to think about—something that might engage my imagination and passions. I soon discovered that the articles I found most interesting and exciting addressed issues of stereotyping and prejudice. With each article I read, I checked off publications in the reference list that I wanted to read next. And I kept reading. And reading. I found myself fully captivated by the issues; I could not stop thinking about them.

Although there were many interesting facets to my reading, there were two articles, in particular, that I could not stop thinking about (Billig, 1985, and Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980). Why? Bottom line—they bothered me. I should say at the outset that both are terrific articles; they are well-reasoned, thoughtful, and convincing. Nevertheless, I found the conclusions reached by the authors deeply disturbing and, in my view, overly pessimistic. Billig, following Allport (1954) among others, suggested that prejudice is an inevitable consequence of ordinary categorization (stereotyping) processes. So long as stereotypes exist, prejudice will follow. This analysis essentially equated stereotypes with prejudice. My question: Could it really be that easy? What if one truly believed that stereotyping was wrong? What implications did this hold for prejudice reduction? Crosby et al.'s article addressed the troubling paradox that although many people professed to have adopted egalitarian, nonprejudiced attitudes toward members of traditionally stereotyped groups (e.g., African Americans), their actual behaviors often belied their egalitarian sentiments. Crosby et al.'s fundamental position was that verbal reports of attitudes are suspect precisely because they are under the influence of controlled (strategic impression management)

processes. They favored, instead, covert measures—arguing that the strength of these measures is that they do not involve careful, deliberate, and intentional thought. In the spirit of “actions speak louder than words,” Crosby et al. interpreted the inconsistency between people's self-professed, nonprejudiced attitudes and their coexisting prejudiced behaviors as evidence that people merely are lying about their attitudes or are unable to recognize their “true” prejudices. Again I was troubled.

Although the evidence reviewed in both articles was consistent with conclusions drawn, ultimately I found these analyses unsatisfying and limiting. They were fatalistic in implication and offered little guidance or encouragement with regard to prejudice reduction. In short, these articles suggested that true change was not possible and, worse yet, claims of being nonprejudiced reflected little more than strategic impression management tactics—efforts to cover up truly endorsed but socially undesirable attitudes. The conclusions from these articles did not seem to match what appeared to be a genuine struggle to overcome prejudice that I saw in real people's everyday experience and that Myrdal (1944) had characterized as the American dilemma. Similarly, in a very intriguing article, Poskocil (1977) discussed the plight of the well-intentioned but bumbling liberal, who despite deliberate efforts often failed to achieve his or her egalitarian ideals. Such individuals were functionally dismissed from these conceptualizations. Several questions consumed my attention: Is prejudice reduction possible? Could people have truly changed their attitudes yet remain vulnerable to prejudiced responses? How? Could social desirability concerns be bypassed? How? Was there an alternative explanation for the disparity between self-reported attitudes and less consciously monitored responses—one that would be more optimistic in implications and suggest that change, prejudice reduction, is possible?

Enter the relevance of the other work I was reading. Interest in the cognitive processes underlying social thought and behavior was steadily growing in the field. As a result, I was reading extensively in the cognitive literature. A set of issues that I found both interesting and exciting was the distinction between automatic and controlled processes (e.g., Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Particularly interesting to me was Neely's (1977) article in which he argued that automatic and controlled cognitive processes could operate independently of each other. Neely demonstrated, for example, that when automatic processing would produce a response that conflicted with conscious expectancies, participants inhibited the automatic response and intentionally replaced it with one consistent with their conscious expectancies, but they could only do so if provided with enough time and cognitive capacity to engage controlled processes. Without sufficient time or capacity, the automatic processes would unfold

without interference. This struck me at the time as a tremendously powerful demonstration; the full significance for my thinking about stereotyping and prejudice would become apparent to me only much later.

At the same time, I was reading a variety of social cognition articles that shaped my thinking about the activation and application of stereotypes. Each of these articles addressed the idea that trait constructs activated in one setting could be applied to and affect social inference processes in a subsequent setting (e.g., Bargh, 1984; Bargh & Pietromonico, 1982; Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980).<sup>2</sup> Bargh's work was especially influential because it suggested a strategy for activating constructs that bypassed conscious awareness and, therefore, social desirability concerns. For example, Bargh and Pietromonico demonstrated that trait constructs, such as kindness and hostility, could be passively primed by repeatedly presenting trait-relevant terms in participants' parafoveal visual field. The effects of such passive priming were observed in participants' subsequent judgments of a target who engaged in ambiguous trait-relevant behaviors. For example, when the trait of hostility had been primed at a high level (e.g., on 80 of 100 priming trials), participants rated the target as more hostile than when hostility had been primed at a low level (e.g., on 20 of 100 trials). Beyond being extremely exciting and provocative, Bargh's work not only highlighted the possibility that one could bypass social desirability concerns by automatically, passively priming constructs but provided a specific method for doing so. With this methodological innovation, Bargh's work paved the way for me to explore the possibility that social categories, like stereotypes, could be passively primed in the same way that Bargh and Pietromonico had done for trait constructs.

Examining the consequences of automatic stereotype activation, it seemed to me, would be a powerful way to differentiate individuals low and high in prejudice—precisely because social desirability processes would not come into play (i.e., controlled processes were bypassed altogether). My thinking was that people low in prejudice renounce stereotypes, whereas people high in prejudice endorse them. My goal, then, was to passively prime the stereotype at low and high levels (following Bargh & Pietromonico, 1982) and then to examine judgments of a race-unspecified person who engaged in ambiguously hostile behaviors (Srull & Wyer, 1979). I was interested in hostility be-

cause it is a core characteristic of the stereotype of Blacks. With all this in mind, I wrote a dissertation proposal in which I argued that stereotypes could be automatically activated and that the effect of such automatic priming would differ for people low in prejudice compared with people high in prejudice. I expected prejudice level to moderate the effects of priming, such that only the hostility ratings of people high in prejudice would be strongly affected by the priming manipulation. In developing the stereotype priming words (e.g., *Blacks, afro, musical, ghetto, athletic, blues, lazy*), I was careful not to use any traits directly related to hostility, lest the study be yet another example of trait construct priming rather than social category priming.

After reading my proposal, my graduate advisor, Ostrom, discouraged me from pursuing this line of work. He argued that because my proposed research was not closely related to his area of interest, he could not be as helpful as if I pursued research on person memory issues. Ostrom also cautioned that the research was risky in that I proposed to use what were at the time new techniques for social cognition researchers (i.e., the Bargh and Pietromonico, 1982, passive priming procedure). I thought long and hard about Ostrom's concerns. His arguments were sound, and his advice had previously proved wise. Nevertheless, I was totally captivated by the issues and excited by the potential to integrate classic issues in social psychology with modern theory and methods in cognitive psychology. I concluded that I wanted to take the risk and lobbied for his support. In making my case, I argued that if the research worked out, it would be a powerful demonstration of benefits to be gained by exploring the interface of social and cognitive psychology. Ultimately, Ostrom was supportive of my interest in pursuing this line of work. As a proponent of the "sovereignty of social cognition," perhaps Tom was persuaded by my reasoning. In retrospect, however, I think Tom's acquiescence more likely reflected his confidence in me, something for which I have always been grateful.

So I set off to run the study. I was excited to analyze the data and move forward with the write-up and defense of my dissertation. My excitement, however, was short-lived. The results were not consistent with my expectations. Rather than prejudice level moderating the effect of priming on hostility ratings, there was simply a main effect of priming. Participants low and high in prejudice were equally affected by priming such that hostility ratings were more extreme in the high than the low priming condition. This was a distressing situation to be in, and it was not obvious to me how to make sense of the data (and I did not want to believe Ostrom had been right). We have all done studies that have not worked out exactly as planned, and I started the process we all go through under such cir-

<sup>2</sup> Another article that made a big impression on me was Eliot Smith's (1984) *Psychological Review* article in which he advanced a model of social inference processes that distinguished between what he termed *proceduralized* and *inferential* inferences. Consideration of the details of Smith's theoretical analysis is beyond scope of this article, but his analysis has overlapping implications with the automatic-controlled process distinction and similarly influenced my thinking.

cumstances. I began to systematically explore the possible reasons for my unexpected findings. Had I effectively operationalized my variables? I concluded I had. Were the methods sound? I couldn't identify obvious flaws. I held out hope that perhaps I had miscoded something. No such luck. More discomfort. There I sat with uncooperative data, and it was those data I needed to make sense of and explain. What came next was that I spent long hours sitting at my desk, chin resting in my hands, staring at and puzzling over the graphs from the study. I kept thinking that if I stared at them long enough, something would make sense to me. It was a pretty frustrating process, but then in a single instant everything changed. I literally had one of those "Aha" experiences after which not only did the data make sense to me but I wondered how I could have missed what now seemed so obvious to me. Moreover, making sense of those data provided me with the theoretical analysis that has served as the cornerstone for much of my subsequent research.

In reality, my thinking only needed subtle revision, but the revision reflected a confluence and synthesis of the issues addressed in all of the reading I had been doing. That is, I did not change my assumption that, whereas people high in prejudice believe the stereotype, people low in prejudice do not. Indeed, people low in prejudice renounce stereotypical thinking and endorse egalitarian ideals. Thus, people low in prejudice and people high in prejudice have different personal beliefs about Blacks. However, having been socialized into the same culture, both those low in prejudice and those high in prejudice are equally knowledgeable about the cultural stereotype of Blacks. Recognizing the distinction between stereotypes and beliefs as knowledge structures as well as the possibility that stereotypes and beliefs differentially involve automatic versus controlled processes was critical (a) for making sense of my data and (b) in offering an alternative explanation for the oft observed inconsistencies between self-reports and behaviors noted in Crosby et al.'s (1980) review. What I realized was that the stereotype is a very frequently activated knowledge structure for all people in our culture. As a result, whether one believes that the stereotype is valid or not, it is very easily activated. I concluded that the structures that were automatically activated in the priming task were the culturally defined stereotypes, which are part of one's social heritage rather than part of one's personal beliefs.

This theorizing led me to develop an analysis of the challenges associated with reducing prejudice that suggested an alternative explanation for such inconsistencies between self-reported attitudes and behavior. The key was to recognize that conscious decisions to renounce prejudice do not immediately eliminate prejudiced responses (i.e., they remain as rivals to the newer beliefs). That is, overcoming prejudice requires over-

coming a lifetime of socialization experiences. My work suggested that stereotypes and negative feelings toward groups can be activated automatically—without conscious awareness or intention—even among people whose consciously held attitudes are genuinely nonprejudiced. The rub is that people are not always aware of when the stereotype affects their judgments. It is so easily activated that people must be extremely vigilant in detecting instances in which their judgments of others may be clouded by the stereotype, without their consent or bidding. Indeed, I argued that it was the stereotype (rather than one's personal beliefs) that is activated by default. I further argued that it takes conscious attention, energy, and effort to inhibit the stereotype and, instead, to activate one's personal nonprejudiced beliefs. I suggested that the process of prejudice reduction is akin to the breaking of a habit in which the automatic processes involved in stereotyping must be inhibited and newer responses must be consciously activated and serve as the basis for responding, lest the person "fall into old habits." For those who renounce prejudice, I argued, overcoming prejudice represents a formidable challenge that entails a great deal of internal conflict and occurs over a protracted period of time. However, from this (optimistic) perspective, change, if difficult, was possible. Prejudice was a habit that could be broken.

In the midst of working through all these issues, I had interviewed for a few positions and happily received an offer from the University of Wisconsin. So, once I made sense of things, the next step was to write up and defend my dissertation. Writing it up was not so bad, but the defense proved to be a less enjoyable experience. After the ordinary questioning of the candidate by all committee members, I was sent into the hall so that the committee could deliberate and vote on whether or not to pass me, what revisions would be required, and so on. Typically, people are left in the hall for no more than 10 min or so. My requisite 10 min came and went, as did 15 min, and coming up on 20 or 30 min, I was really starting to sweat. What took so long? Well, although Tony thought the dissertation was fine, he thought it would be really good with one more study. He recommended that a final decision be deferred until I added a new study to the package. One of the difficult issues here was that I was moving to Wisconsin 4 days after my defense! To defer a decision on the defense until a new study was conducted was fraught with implications, none of which would have been happy ones for me. Fortunately for me, other committee members, in particular Tom Ostrom and Gifford Weary, effectively convinced Tony that the dissertation was passable and assured him that I was likely to continue doing research (and that it did not all need to be in the dissertation). During a wonderful dinner with Tony this past May, I asked him about all this—he has no recollection of making this recommen-

dation following my defense (and why should he remember the details of one student's defense—he has participated in so many through the years).

The next bump along the way was to transform a 350-page dissertation into a journal article (this experience may be partly why we encourage students at Wisconsin to write their dissertations pretty much as a journal article—lots of extra information can be included in appendixes). Len Berkowitz offered to read a draft of the article before I submitted it for publication. His comments led to a critical revision in the discussion of the article. Len cautioned that people might read this article and find excuses for their prejudice (i.e., if activation was automatic, then how could one be held accountable for its effects?). Providing that type of excuse was not at all what I had intended. My goal was to understand the nature of the challenges people face in combating prejudice, and I believed that understanding these challenges would be the only position from which progress in overcoming prejudice was possible. In response to Len's cautionary observation, I included an explicit statement in the discussion of my article noting that the analysis was not intended to provide an excuse for prejudice. In an extremely thoughtful article addressing the role of intent in stereotyping and prejudice, Susan Fiske (1989) noted that people can make the hard choice. I do not think I fully realized when I started this program of research just how much issues of personal and moral responsibility would feature into my thinking. It was in working through these issues that I concluded that, indeed, I truly wanted to work on socially significant issues. My initial foray into the study of prejudice and stereotyping had become much more than "something interesting to think about." Rather, it developed into an opportunity to contribute not only to scientific discovery but potentially to the development of productive applications that may mitigate some of the ill effects of prejudice in people's everyday lives.

Although personally I found the work fascinating and was compelled by the conceptual analysis reported in my article, I could not have envisioned that this article would have elicited such widespread interest or attention. Indeed, I have been asked from time to time (mostly by graduate students during colloquium visits) if I intended to write an article that would be "attention getting" or "agenda setting." I guess that answer is yes and no. On the yes side, I think we all want others to read our work. And, one can only hope to be fortunate enough to have others be interested enough or "discomforted" enough (see Fiske, this issue) to want to do research that addresses—whether to support or challenge—the work. Oddly enough, the article was comforting to some and discomforting to others. I think the article was comforting to some people in the sense that it provided an explanation—without accusation—of both the origin and the stubbornness of some of their

biases. For those who were struggling with these issues, the article provided an optimistic view of the possibility for prejudice reduction. And the article was discomforting to others for the reasons Fiske outlined in her article in this issue and because some of the model's assumptions were ripe for challenge (e.g., is automatic stereotype activation inevitable?).

On the no side, however, I cannot say that I set an explicit goal to be particularly provocative or to write an article that would be discomforting. I do not think I would have known (or now know) how to do that. As noted previously, in starting the work, I was pretty much just looking for issues that interested me and then set about to study them using the conceptual and methodological tools available to me. In fact, it is not really clear to me that anyone can anticipate what others will find interesting (let alone be able to anticipate what is likely to score high on the discomfort index). There is a kind of "right time, right place, right approach" quality to ideas whose time has come. For example, I could not have made the breakthrough I did without the then emerging interest in the distinction between automatic and controlled processing and without the efforts of social cognition researchers who had begun exploring the relevance of cognitive processes to understanding basic social psychological phenomena (see Strack & Deutch, this issue). In addition, if this zeitgeist had not existed, the article might not have struck a chord with readers. I might not have found the stereotyping and prejudice articles so captivating (and ultimately troubling) without my incipient concerns when I was growing up that unwarranted inferences were all too easily and quickly based on group membership. Added to this mix was the context created during my time at OSU that afforded me the opportunity to develop and explore these ideas.

Nevertheless, I think the major reason for interest in this article and the "industry of efforts to contradict, undermine, qualify, or build on it" (Fiske, this issue) may be the topic itself. The topic has the qualities of being theoretically rich, extremely complicated, and practically important—an effective recipe for garnering interest and research activity. This is a set of issues that we, as social psychologists, want to understand. However, interest in this set of issues is not simply the province of social psychologists. It extends to other social scientists, politicians, lawmakers, and educators, as well as laypeople.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, my article provided a modern theoretical perspective on the classic American dilemma (Myrdal, 1944), and as such appears to have focused renewed attention on "old problems in social psychology" (Fiske, this issue).

---

<sup>3</sup>Witness the recent turmoil associated with Trent Lott's insensitive remarks concerning desegregation at Strom Thurmond's 100th birthday party that ultimately led to his stepping down as speaker of the House. Many more examples, of course, could be cited.

In the years following the publication of my article, I must say that I was surprised, if not overwhelmed, by the amount of research activity stimulated by my article. As a young assistant professor, however, I did not really know if I should be heartened or worried. In retrospect, I both can both appreciate why the article was of interest and feel fortunate to have developed an analysis that would be thought provoking to others. At a conference I participated in recently, Laurie Rudman asked me why I thought that whereas many who followed up on my work were primarily concerned with the issues of automaticity of stereotype (or evaluation) activation, I have spent most of my time addressing issues on the more controlled side of the equation. I think part of the interest in automaticity of stereotype activation was that the claim that all people, whether they endorsed stereotypes or not, would be prone to their activation struck some people as too extreme, though a great many studies have supported the automatic activation of stereotypes. Nevertheless, surely there would be some circumstances under which stereotypes would not be automatically activated (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Lepore & Brown, 1997), and surely there would be more variability in the extent to which stereotypes or evaluation would be automatically activated (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Wittenbrink, Judd & Park, 1997). What these challenges to my original formulation have led to is a more nuanced understanding of the basic processes involved in the activation and control of stereotypes and prejudice.

As for why my own work has focused primarily on the controlled side of things, there are really two answers to this question—one practical and one conceptual. On the practical side, I did not have the programming expertise to write programs that would enable the subliminal presentation of stimuli on the computer screen (I did my original study using a tachistoscope) nor the money to pay a programmer (or buy my own tachistoscope). In many ways, this was just as well because at the time, conceptually, I was most captivated by the dilemma created for people low in prejudice when they responded in biased ways.<sup>4</sup> It seemed to me that if people low in prejudice were serious about and committed to their self-reported low-prejudice values, then violations of them should be consequential (e.g., Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991) and should play a role in their ongoing efforts to combat prejudice (e.g., Devine & Monteith, 1993, 1999; Monteith, 1993). In other work, we examined how the challenges associated with prejudice reduction play out in the interpersonal arena and the nature of intergroup tension (e.g., Devine, Evett, &

Vasquez-Suson, 1996). In more recent years, we have begun considering the role of personal and external motivations to respond without prejudice for a variety of intra- and interpersonal processes (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998, 2001, 2003). What has struck me over time is how much my 1989 article actually anticipated the broad set of issues that has kept me busy in the years following its publication. And, although I have spent a great deal of time focused on the “controlled” side of things, this work has brought me full circle to exploring the issues of automaticity and the interplay between automaticity and control (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, in press; Amodio, Harmon-Jones, Devine, et al., 2003; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance, 2002). In my own work, I see much more to do and, as my work unfolds, I can only hope to propose some new ideas that will score high on the discomfort index.

### Note

Patricia G. Devine, Department of Psychology, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1202 West Johnson Street, Madison, WI 53706. E-mail: pgdevine@facstaff.wisc.edu

### References

- Allport, G. W. (1954). *The nature of prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., & Devine, P. G. (2003). Individual differences in the activation and control of affective race bias as assessed by startle eyeblink responses and self-report. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84*, 738–753.
- Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., Devine, P. G., Curtin, J. J., Hartley, S., & Covert, A. (in press). Neural signals for the control of unintentional race bias. *Psychological Science*.
- Bargh, J. A. (1984). Automatic and conscious processing of social information. In R. S. Wyer Jr. & T. K. Srull (Eds.), *The handbook of social cognition* (Vol. 3, pp. 1–43). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Bargh, J. A., & Pietromonico, P. (1982). Automatic information processing and social perception: The influence of trait information presented outside of conscious awareness on impression formation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43*, 437–449.
- Billig, M. (1985). Prejudice, categorization, and particularization: From a perceptual to a rhetorical approach. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 15*, 79–103.
- Crosby, F., Bromley, S., & Saxe, L. (1980). Recent unobtrusive studies of Black and White discrimination and prejudice: A literature review. *Psychological Bulletin, 87*, 546–563.
- Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56*, 5–18.
- Devine, P. G., Evett, S. R., & Vasquez-Suson, K. A. (1996). Exploring the interpersonal dynamics of interracial context. In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of motivation and cognition: The interpersonal context* (Vol. 3, pp. 423–464). New York: Guilford.

<sup>4</sup>In addition to these types of observations, I also confessed to Laurie and the other conferees that I was the “Queen of Optimism.” My core interest was in understanding the challenges associated with overcoming prejudice, which is something I still believe people can do despite the difficulties they face along the way.

- Devine P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1993). The role of discrepancy associated affect in prejudice reduction. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), *Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in intergroup perception* (pp. 317–344). San Diego, CA: Academic.
- Devine, P. G., & Monteith, M. J. (1999). Automaticity and control in stereotyping. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), *Dual process theories in social psychology* (pp. 339–360). New York: Guilford.
- Devine, P. G., Monteith, M., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*, 817–830.
- Devine, P. G., Plant, E. A., Amodio, D. M., Harmon-Jones, E., & Vance, S. L., (2002). Exploring the relationship between implicit and explicit prejudice: The role of motivations to respond without prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*, 835–848.
- Fazio, R., Jackson, J., Dunton, B., & Williams, C. (1995). Variability in automatic activation as an unobtrusive measure of racial attitudes: A bona fide pipeline? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *69*, 1013–1027.
- Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the role of intent: Toward understanding its role in stereotyping and prejudice. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *Unintended thought* (pp. 253–283). New York: Guilford.
- Gilbert, D. T., & Hixon, J. G. (1991). The trouble with thinking: Activation and application of stereotypic beliefs. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*, 509–517.
- Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. *American Psychologist*, *36*, 603–618.
- Higgins, E. T., Rholes, W. S., & Jones, C. R. (1977). Category accessibility and impression formation. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *13*, 141–154.
- Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice inevitable? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*, 275–287.
- Monteith, M. J. (1993). Self-regulation of stereotypical responses: Implications for progress in prejudice reduction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*, 469–485.
- Myrdal, G. (1944). *An American dilemma*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Neely, J. H. (1977). Semantic priming and retrieval from lexical memory: Roles of inhibitionless spreading activation and limited-capacity attention. *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, *106*, 226–254.
- Ostrom, T. M. (1984). The sovereignty of social cognition. In R. S. Wyer Jr. & T. K. Srull (Eds.), *Handbook of social cognition* (Vol. 1, pp. 1–38). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
- Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (1998). Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*, 811–832.
- Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2001). Beyond compliance with nonprejudiced social pressure: Acceptance or backlash? *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *37*, 486–501.
- Plant, E. A., & Devine, P. G. (2003). *Regulatory concerns for interracial interactions: Approaching egalitarianism versus avoiding overt bias*. Manuscript submitted for publication.
- Poskocil, A. (1977). Encounters between Black and White liberals: The collision of stereotypes. *Social Forces*, *55*, 715–727.
- Pratkanis, A. R., Leippe, M. R., Greenwald, A. G., & Baumgardner, M. H. (1988). In search of reliable persuasion effects: III. The sleeper effect is dead—Long live the sleeper effect. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *54*, 203–218.
- Shiffrin, R. M., & Schneider, W. (1977). Controlled and automatic human information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a general theory. *Psychological Review*, *84*, 127–190.
- Smith, E. R. (1984). Model of social inference processes. *Psychological Review*, *91*, 392–413.
- Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1979). The role of category accessibility and interpretation of information about persons. Some determinants and implications. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *37*, 1660–1672.
- Srull, T. K., & Wyer, R. S., Jr. (1980). Category accessibility and social perception: Some implications for the study of person memory and interpersonal judgments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *38*, 841–856.
- Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *72*, 262–274.